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CONSULTANTS CORPORATION,
ff-Appellant,

I

Case No. 880606-CA

vs.
Category 14b
DALE SMEDLEY and THE FIRST
NATIONAL BANK OF LAYTON,
Defendant-Appellees.
STATEMENT

FACTS
j

Appex

without

the trial because .the errors asserted
from

written record which exists.

Bank

transcript of

appellant mite L Lear
Defendant First National

Layton has responded

estimony

which was not admitted into evidence c? trial, and by otherwise
attemiii i in i i

iiniif" 1111 n version of the facts, which was rejected

by the jury.
appeal.
issut:

factua

isputes are

M

Vi i,ssue

Appellant objects

Bank's attempt to color the

,.:

e factual issues where the

Bank has not appealed

otherwise challenged the verdiei

Mm

jury.
1
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The Bank's primary claim is that, by virtue ^
,::

XL. acquired

Smedley's rights with respect to plai

*

became

«

subrogated

nnn-

without merit.

There are no benefits awarded by the law to a

conspirator.
The distinction between recoupment
significance

in this case.

and offset

Both recoupment

is of no

and offset are

available only to one who has a claim against the plaintiff.
The

Bank had

no

claim

against

the plaintiff,

and

was not

entitled to offset or recoupment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE BANK DID NOT ACQUIRE ANY "RIGHTS"
BY ITS CONSPIRACY WITH SMEDLEY.
The

primary

thrust

of

the

Brief

of

Respondent

First

National Bank of Layton ("Bank Brief") appears to be that the
Bank was entitled to the benefit of Smedley's offsets as a right
flowing to the Bank by virtue of its conspiracy with Smedley:
By finding conspiracy, the jury supplied the
mutuality of obligation which plaintiff
alleges is lacking as to the Bank and by
becoming a co-conspirator, the Bank was
entitled to all of the offsets that Smedley
was entitled to.
Bank Brief at 2.
The Bank knew it did not have an independent
cause of action that would support setoff or
counterclaim and the Bank therefore had to
rely upon Smedley's claim because that's
what the Bank relied upon in getting
involved in an attempt to salvage Smedley's
equity.
Bank Brief at 5.
The jury was fully informed as to the
participation of the Bank and the reasons
therefore [sic] and by instructing the jury
on conspiracy, upon a finding of conspiracy
2

the Bank became subrogated to all of the
rights and obligations of Smedley.
By
asserting conspiracy, plaintiff puts the
Bank in the same position as an equitable
subrogee, putting the Bank in Smedley's
shoes as to the conversion cause of action.
Bank Brief at 6.
But neither plaintiff nor the jury has a
right to pick or choose only the liabilities
of conspiracy and not the benefits that go
with it. . • . [P]laintiff in alleging the
conspiracy, and the jury in finding conspiracy to exist under the instructions given by
the court, must also accord to the Bank as a
co-conspirator all of the benefits to which
Smedley was entitled.
Bank Brief at
»

a court

the Bank some benefit
astounding

11- i «<

in equity was required to give

« a result o r

s

surprising that the Bank has failed to
novel proposition.

Plaintiff has similarly been unable
directly supporting

contradicting the Bank's theory

would not expec1
attempted -

one

-- conspirator had

claim that he had some legal rights as a resn
:ic most closely analogous situation is that

a partnership.

Even among.lawi

offset claimed by the Bank does not exist.

When an indi\

person who also owes ,a debt: to the
partnership, the individual partner general
offset on his personal debt by reason
the partnership.

imt

11

n

f the plaintiff's debt to

.~. -ere1aim. Recoupment, and

Setoff § 126 (1965); White v. Jackson, 252 S.C. 274, 1 66 S E, 2d

211

(1969).

Arseneau,

See

M.D.S..

also

Caradonna

P.C..

118

v,

Cunningham,

A.D.2d

1031,

500

Sponzo

and

NoY.S.2d

404

(1986); Security Management Company v, King, 132 Ga. App. 618,
208 S.E.2d 576 (1974); Kamer v. ITT Life Insurance Company, 33
A.D.2d 682; 305 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1969).
This principle is also illustrated by the case of Sturges
v. Bennett, 47 Ariz. 470, 56 P.2d 1038 (1936).
that

case

had

executed

a promissory

plaintiff, who was an attorney.

The defendant in

note

in

favor

of the

The promissory note had been

executed in connection with litigation between the defendant and
the plaintiff's

client.

The defendant

and

client had been partners in a partnership.
action

on the

note, the defendant

the

plaintiff's

In defense to the

asserted

that

the prior

litigation had been a "frame-up" between the attorney and his
client which had the effect of depriving the defendant of most
of his interest in the partnership.

The court rejected the

defendant's claims on several grounds, including that "[t]he
counterclaim set up by the defendant against Allen [the client],
even if proved, could not be an offset against a debt owed by
defendant to Bennett, the plaintiff."

56 P.2d at 1040-41.

The Bank also claims that it is entitled to some rights as
a "equitable subrogee" of Smedley.

(Bank Brief at 6.)

The Bank

cites as support for this proposition the case of International
Equipment Service, Inc. v. Pocatello Industrial Park Co., 107
Idaho

1116, 695 P.2d

1255

(1985).

authorities as follows:
4

That

case quotes other

Equitable subrogation is a legal device
which permits a party who has been required
to satisfy a loss created by a third-party's
wrong to step into the shoes of the loser
and recover from the wrongdoer.
695 P.2d at 1258 (citations omitted).
Under this rule cited by the Bank, the only way the Bank
would be subrogated to Smedleyfs rights would be if the Bank
had, pursuant to a contractual or other duty owed to Smedley,
paid to Smedley the amount of any obligations owed by plaintiff
to Smedley.

The payment would need to have been compulsory; a

voluntary payment does not entitle one to subrogation.
doctrine obviously has no application in this case.

The

First, the

Bank did not pay to Smedley any of plaintifffs obligations.
Second,

even

if the

Bank's payment

of the

GECC

note were

considered to meet the requirements, the payment was wholly
voluntary.

The Bank clearly was not an equitable subrogee of

Smedley's rights against plaintiff.
These authorities establish that even if the relationship
between

Smedley

and

the

Bank

was

a

legitimate,

voluntary

partnership, the Bank would not have been entitled to claim any
offset based on an obligation owed by a plaintiff to Smedley.
The authorities further establish that the Bank has not met the
requirements of an equitable Subrogee.

It is even more certain

that the Bank, coming into court with the unclean hands of a
conspirator, may not in good faith claim that the court in the
exercise of its equitable powers is required to accord the Bank
the "benefits11 of the Bank's conspiracy with Smedley.

5

The trial

court erred in granting the Bank any offset based on Smedley's
claims against plaintiff,
POINT II
THE BANK DID NOT PLEAD NOR WAS IT ENTITLED
TO CLAIM ANY OFFSET OR RECOUPMENT.
The Bank acknowledges that it did not claim any right to an
offset in its pleadings.

Bank Brief at 6.

The Bank attempts to

avoid this pleading defect by now claiming for the first time
that

its

offset.

unplead

defense

was

Bank Brief at 4.

actually

for

recoupment,

not

First, the Bank's claim is not

properly labeled as recoupment.

Second, even if the proper

label

offset,

is

recoupment

instead

of

the

distinction

is

without legal significance.
"Recoupment" is a label used at common law to refer to a
counterclaim arising out of the same transaction.

It could not

be the basis for affirmative relief, but only to reduce the
amount of the plaintiff's recovery.

Setoffs, in contrast, were

based on unrelated claims and served as sources of affirmative
relief.

Elder v. Triax Co. , 740 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1987).

The distinctions are of little modern significance.

20 Am. Jur.

2d Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff § 10 (1965).
The distinction between the two terms is concisely set
forth in Black's Law Dictionary 1147 (5th ed. 1979) as follows:
Set-off distinguished.
A "set-off" is a
demand which the defendant has against the
plaintiff, arising out of a transaction
extrinsic to the plaintiff's cause of
action, whereas a "recoupment" is a reduction or rebate by the defendant of part of
the plaintiff's claim because of a right in
6

the defendant
transaction.

arising

out

of

the

same

(Citation omitted.)
The distinction between setoff and recoupment, in other
words, is based solely on whether or not the claim arises out of
the same transaction.

Setoff and recoupment

are the same,

however, in that both require that the claim be one owed to the
defendant

by

the

plaintiff.

Neither

setoff

or

recoupment

permits a defendant to claim a benefit by reason of a debt the
plaintiff may owe to another person.
The foregoing and plaintiff's initial brief establish that
the Bank was not entitled to a setoff based on amounts the
plaintiff owed to Smedley.

The trial court's award of such a

setoff must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The offsets given to the Bank should be disallowed, and
judgment entered for plaintiff for the value of the drill rig
converted by the Bank.

The case should also be remanded for a

new trial on the issue of punitive damages for the reasons set
forth in plaintiff's initial brief.
DATED this 7th day of February, 1989.

JACKSON HOWARD,
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Attorneys for Appellant
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